Siege of Knoxville: Peparations

"It was determined by the Federal authorities to make strenuous efforts during the summer of 1863 to effect permanent lodgments in East Tennessee, both at Chattanooga and Knoxville, not only for the purpose of interrupting railway communication by that route, but to afford relief to a section where Union sentiments were known to exist to a very considerable extent. It was accordingly arranged that Rosecrans should move from Murfreesboro against Bragg, while a force should be organized in central Kentucky to move toward Knoxville in cooperation. The latter movement was intrusted to General Burnside, who occupied Knoxville on the 2d of September, 1863, with part of the Twenty third Corps, and on the 9th, received the surrender of the Confederate force under General John W Frazer at Cumberland Gap.

Defense of Knoxville

It was determined by the Federal authorities to make strenuous efforts during the summer of 1863 to effect permanent lodgments in east Tennessee, both at Chattanooga and Knoxville, not only for the purpose of interrupting railway communication by that route, but to afford relief to a section where Union sentiments were known to exist to a very considerable extent. It was accordingly arranged that Rosecrans should move from Murfreesboro against Bragg, while a force should be organized in central Kentucky to move toward Knoxville in cooperation. The latter movement was intrusted to General Burnside, who occupied Knoxville on the 2d of September, 1863, with part of the Twenty third Corps, and on the 9th, received the surrender of the Confederate force under General John W Frazer at Cumberland Gap.

The greater portion of General Burnside's force was now expected to move down the Valley of the Tennessee to a connection (possibly a junction) with Rosecrans, then at Chattanooga or its vicinity. This involved leaving Knoxville to be held by a small force, and rendered it necessary to fortify the place. Accordingly, as chief engineer, I was instructed to arrange for a garrison of 600 men, intended only to hold the place against a cavalry dash. During the enemy's occupation of Knoxville, a very small beginning had been made toward the erection of earth works. An insignificant line had been thrown up on the hill north west of the college and a slight epaulement on the bluff overlooking the railway station.

Neither of these was of use in the construction of our works. The plans for two works were submitted- one afterward known as Fort Sanders, on the site of the imperfect work first mentioned, and the other afterward known as Fort Huntington Smith, on Temperance Hill in East Knoxville. These plans were approved by General Burnside, and work was at once begun by the engineer battalion of the Twenty third Corps and a small force of negroes, but progressed slowly on account of the difficulty of getting suitable materials. The forts were not entirely completed until after the siege of Knoxville. Meanwhile our lines were extended down the valley toward Chattanooga. By the 18th of September a battalion of cavalry in the extreme advance reached Cleveland, and the prospect for a junction was good until Chickamauga put an end to further movements in that direction, and Sweetwater became our outpost.

Early in October a force of the enemy under General John S Williams, coming from the eastward, moved down the railroad to the vicinity of Bull's Gap, and pressed heavily upon our forces in that quarter. With such troops as could readily be concentrated, General Burnside attacked them at Blue Springs on the 10th and drove them well back toward Bristol. On the 22d of October our outpost at Sweetwater and our reserve at Philadelphia were attacked successfully. Subsequent operations and reconnaissances resulted in the determination to abandon temporarily the Valley of the Tennessee south of Loudon. The troops were all withdrawn and the pontoon bridge was transferred from Loudon to Knoxville, where General Sanders's cavalry command crossed it to the south side of the river, on the lst of November. The abandonment of London had in view the occupation of a stronger position on the northern bank of the river from Kingston to Lenoir's, where a pontoon bridge was to be thrown across the Holston, and the line prolonged by the right bank of the Little Tennessee.

On the 13th of November it was ascertained that the enemy had constructed a pontoon bridge at Hutf's Ferry, near Loudon, and were crossing in force to the northern bank of the Tennessee. At the same time General Wheeler, with nearly the whole of his four brigades of cavalry, made a rapid night march and crossed the Little Tennessee with a view to cutting off Sanders's command, and occupying the heights opposite Knoxville, or as stated by Longstreet, 'failing in this to threaten the enemy at Knoxville so as to prevent his concentrating against us before we reached Knoxville.' Wheeler was foiled in this attempt and soon withdrew to the north bank of the river, which he crossed at Louisville. He rejoined Longstreet on the 17th of November, after the latter had fought the battle of Campbell's Station.

Upon learning of Longstreet's movement, General Burnside took personal command of the troops available to oppose him. The operations of our forces during the next few days had for their object to delay the advance of the enemy to enable us to get our trains into Knoxville, and to forward the defensive works at that place, where it had been determined to make a stand Longstreet advanced from Loudon in two columns. McLaws's division taking the left road, leading to Campbell's Station, and Hood's division (commanded by Jenkins), the one to the right, following the line of the railroad to Lenoir's. The latter soon came in contact with the Federal skirmishers and drove them slowly back but failed to reach Lenoir's that day. Every effort was made during the night to ascertain Burnside's movements, but his bold and vigilant rear guard succeeded in completely concealing them. By daybreak the whole force was on the road, and when the Confederates advanced they found Lenoir's deserted.

The road upon which Burnside was moving, followed by Jenkins, intersects that along which McLaws was advancing, about a mile south west of Campbell's Station. It was therefore essential to the safety of his train, if not of his entire command, that Burnside should reach the junction before McLaws. Just before daylight on the 16th of November, Hartranft's division took the advance of Burnside's column from Lenoir's and pushed forward as rapidly as the roads permitted, followed by the trains and by the other troops. McLaws, with full knowledge of the importance of seizing the intersection of the roads, was making every endeavor to get possession before the arrival of Burnside. He was opposed by a small force, but his march like Hartranft's, was impeded by the mud resulting from heavy rains. It thus became a race for the position. Hartranft won by perhaps half an hour, and turning west on the Kingston road, quickly deployed his division in such manner as to confront McLaws, and at the same time cover the London road along which our trains were moving.

During the movement from Lenoir's, Burnside's rear guard, composed of Colonel William Humphrey's brigade, had several sharp encounters with Jenkins's advance, in which Humphrey handled his forces so well as to excite the admiration of both friends and foes, always standing long enough, but never too long.

Scarcely had Hartranft's dispositions been made when McLaws appeared and attacked, but Hartrauft steadfastly held his ground until the remainder of our troops and all our trains had safely passed. The trains continued on the road to Knoxville, while the troops were formed in line of battle about half a mile beyond the junction, with Ferrero's division on the right, and White's in prolongation to the left, whereupon Hartranft withdrew from his advanced position and took his place in line on the left of White. A small cavalry force scouted the roads on each flank of the line. About noon Longstreet unsuccessfully attacked our right, and afterward our left center. Later, taking advantage of a wooded ridge to conceal the march, he attempted to turn our left flank with three brigades of Jenkins's division, but our scouts soon discovered and reported the movement. Burnside had determined to retire to a new position about two thirds of a mile to his rear, and this development but slightly hastened his withdrawal from the first line. The difficult and hazardous undertaking was successfully accomplished in the face of the enemy. All who saw it say that the troops moved with the greatest coolness, deliberation, and precision under a heavy and continuous fire.

McLaws's division promptly advanced to attack the new position, while Jenkins continued his turning movement, but the difficulties of the ground delayed him until nightfall and stopped his further progress. McLaws attacked and failed to make an impression, and at the close of the action Burnside remained in possession of his own ground until after dark, and then continued his movement to Knoxville, the head of his column appearing there about daybreak next morning November 17th. He had gained his object and therefore was fairly entitled to claim a victory.

Burnside placed his whole loss in this important affair of Campbell's Station at about 300, Jenkins reported his as 174. It is probable that the losses on both sides, including McLaws's, were about equal.

During the fight Burnside had instructed me to select lines of defense around Knoxville and have everything prepared to put the troops into position as fast as they should arrive. I was well acquainted with the ground, and but little further examination was necessary to enable me to designate, in writing, the proposed location of each organization. The topographical features of the vicinity of Knoxville give that place decided strength as a military position. {See maps pp 636 and 736} On the northern or right bank of the Holston, a narrow table land, or ridge, beginning about two miles east of the town extends down the river to Lenoir's some 24 miles. This ridge is generally elevated about 150 feet above the river, but with many higher points. Its width at Knoxville is about 1300 yards, and the valley bounding it on the north-west, parallel with the river is perhaps 50 feet above that stream at the ordinary stage of water. The East Tennessee Virginia and Georgia railroad is located along the valley, which was almost entirely clear of timber. At short intervals the ridge is cut through by small streams emptying into the Holston, two of which called First and Second Creeks, run through the town at a distance apart of about one thousand yards. The main portion of Knoxville, as it existed at the time of the siege, occupied that portion of the table-land included between the two creeks, the river and the valley. East Knoxville was situated next east of First Creek, upon an elevation known as Temperance Hill. East of Temperance Hill, and separated from it by a depression in the ridge, is Mabry's Hill, the highest ground on the north side of the Holston within cannon range of the town. Beyond this the ground with a few minor elevations gradually descends to the level of the valley. Flint Hill is immediately upon the bank of the river, south of Temperance Hill. Third Creek a little more than a mile westward from Second Creek, forms the south-westerly limit of another natural division of the ridge including the hill north west from the college. North-westerly from the river are found successive ridges; the most important was occupied by the Confederates, across the valley a mile from our line. South of the Holston the ground rises in a series of prominent points, or knobs, the highest of which is directly opposite Knoxville on the prolongation of Gay street. These knobs form a range, the crest line of which is parallel with the river at an average distance from it of about half a mile, with a wide valley beyond.

On the Knoxville side of the Holston, our line rested upon the river about a quarter of a mile below the mouth of Second Creek extended from there at an angle of about 82° with the river for 900 yards to Battery Noble, then bending about 50º to the northward continued a little more than 600 yards to Fort Sanders, where it changed direction about 65° to the eastward, and overlooking the valley followed the crest of the bluff, parallel with the general course of the river, for some 1600 yards to Battery Wiltsie, opposite the railroad station, including in this part of the line Battery Zoellner between Fort Sanders and Second Creek, Battery Galpin, just east of Second Creek, and Fort Comstock, between Battery Galpin and Battery Wiltsie. From the last named, with a slight change of direction toward the river, the line continued along the crest of the bluff, over Temperance Hill to Mabry's Hill, a distance of 2400 yards, including Battery Billingsley, just west of First Creek, Fort Huntington Smith on Temperance Hill, Battery Clifton Lee, and Battery Stearman, in the depression between Temperance Hill and Mabry's Hill, and Fort Hill on the extreme easterly point of Mabry's Hill. From here it turned sharply to the southward for 1300 yards and reached the river at a ravine about 1000 yards above the mouth of First Creek. A continuous line of infantry cover connected all these positions and dams were built at the crossing of First and Second Creeks which, by backing the water, formed considerable obstacles, especially in front of Temperance Hill where the line was parallel with the course of First Creek for 1200 yards and the pond impassable without bridges. A short interior line was established from Fort Sanders to Second Creek near its mouth. This included Fort Byington built around the college. Another line extended from Temperance Hill to Flint Hill terminating in Battery Fearns.

On the south side of the river such of the heights (four in number) as were necessary to the defense were occupied by detached works with extensions for infantry cover, insufficient, however, to make the line continuous, or even approximately so. Fort Stanley was built on the hill directly opposite Knoxville, and a line of ordinary rifle-trenches was carried eastward from it across the Sevierville road and to the adjacent height. The hill nearly opposite the mouth of Second Creek was occupied by Fort Dickerson, and the next one to the westward by Fort Higley.

The arrangements for the defense of the position on the north side of the Holston were necessarily made in the most hurried manner. The earth works known as Fort Sanders and Fort Huntington Smith, intended for a very different condition of affairs, were so far advanced toward completion when Longstreet appeared before Knoxville, that their use without modification was compulsory. Neither of the plans was what it would have been had the works been designed for parts of a continuous line. Especially was this the case with respect to Fort Sanders, the trace of which was such that under the stress of circumstances its north western bastion became a prominent salient of the main line, and notwithstanding the measures taken to remedy this objectionable feature its existence caused us great anxiety. The sector without fire of the bastion referred to (the one attacked) would have been a sector without fire for the line, but for the arrangements made on either side of it to overcome the defect as far as possible. The fire thus obtained in front of this bastion was not all that could have been desired, but the event proved that it was sufficient. That Longstreet's renowned infantry failed to carry it by assault demonstrated that there were no very serious defects unprovided for. 

(Source: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Being for the Most ..., Volume 3, Part 2, edited by Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buel)