"It was determined by the Federal authorities to make strenuous efforts during the summer of 1863 to effect permanent lodgments in East Tennessee, both at Chattanooga and Knoxville, not only for the purpose of interrupting railway communication by that route, but to afford relief to a section where Union sentiments were known to exist to a very considerable extent. It was accordingly arranged that Rosecrans should move from Murfreesboro against Bragg, while a force should be organized in central Kentucky to move toward Knoxville in cooperation. The latter movement was intrusted to General Burnside, who occupied Knoxville on the 2d of September, 1863, with part of the Twenty third Corps, and on the 9th, received the surrender of the Confederate force under General John W Frazer at Cumberland Gap.
Defense of Knoxville
It was determined by the Federal
authorities to make strenuous efforts during the summer of 1863 to
effect permanent lodgments in east Tennessee, both at Chattanooga and
Knoxville, not only for the purpose of interrupting railway
communication by that route, but to afford relief to a section where
Union sentiments were known to exist to a very considerable extent.
It was accordingly arranged that Rosecrans should move from
Murfreesboro against Bragg, while a force should be organized in
central Kentucky to move toward Knoxville in cooperation. The latter
movement was intrusted to General Burnside, who occupied Knoxville on
the 2d of September, 1863, with part of the Twenty third Corps, and
on the 9th, received the surrender of the Confederate force under
General John W Frazer at Cumberland Gap.
The greater portion of General
Burnside's force was now expected to move down the Valley of the
Tennessee to a connection (possibly a junction) with Rosecrans, then
at Chattanooga or its vicinity. This involved leaving Knoxville to be
held by a small force, and rendered it necessary to fortify the
place. Accordingly, as chief engineer, I was instructed to arrange
for a garrison of 600 men, intended only to hold the place against a
cavalry dash. During the enemy's occupation of Knoxville, a very
small beginning had been made toward the erection of earth works. An
insignificant line had been thrown up on the hill north west of the
college and a slight epaulement on the bluff overlooking the railway
station.
Neither of these was of use in the
construction of our works. The plans for two works were submitted-
one afterward known as Fort Sanders, on the site of the imperfect
work first mentioned, and the other afterward known as Fort
Huntington Smith, on Temperance Hill in East Knoxville. These plans
were approved by General Burnside, and work was at once begun by the
engineer battalion of the Twenty third Corps and a small force of
negroes, but progressed slowly on account of the difficulty of
getting suitable materials. The forts were not entirely completed
until after the siege of Knoxville. Meanwhile our lines were extended
down the valley toward Chattanooga. By the 18th of September a
battalion of cavalry in the extreme advance reached Cleveland, and
the prospect for a junction was good until Chickamauga put an end to
further movements in that direction, and Sweetwater became our
outpost.
Early in October a force of the enemy
under General John S Williams, coming from the eastward, moved down
the railroad to the vicinity of Bull's Gap, and pressed heavily upon
our forces in that quarter. With such troops as could readily be
concentrated, General Burnside attacked them at Blue Springs on the
10th and drove them well back toward Bristol. On the 22d of October
our outpost at Sweetwater and our reserve at Philadelphia were
attacked successfully. Subsequent operations and reconnaissances
resulted in the determination to abandon temporarily the Valley of
the Tennessee south of Loudon. The troops were all withdrawn and the
pontoon bridge was transferred from Loudon to Knoxville, where
General Sanders's cavalry command crossed it to the south side of the
river, on the lst of November. The abandonment of London had in view
the occupation of a stronger position on the northern bank of the
river from Kingston to Lenoir's, where a pontoon bridge was to be
thrown across the Holston, and the line prolonged by the right bank
of the Little Tennessee.
On the 13th of November it was
ascertained that the enemy had constructed a pontoon bridge at Hutf's
Ferry, near Loudon, and were crossing in force to the northern bank
of the Tennessee. At the same time General Wheeler, with nearly the
whole of his four brigades of cavalry, made a rapid night march and
crossed the Little Tennessee with a view to cutting off Sanders's
command, and occupying the heights opposite Knoxville, or as stated
by Longstreet, 'failing in this to threaten the enemy at Knoxville so
as to prevent his concentrating against us before we reached
Knoxville.' Wheeler was foiled in this attempt and soon withdrew to
the north bank of the river, which he crossed at Louisville. He
rejoined Longstreet on the 17th of November, after the latter had
fought the battle of Campbell's Station.
Upon learning of Longstreet's
movement, General Burnside took personal command of the troops
available to oppose him. The operations of our forces during the next
few days had for their object to delay the advance of the enemy to
enable us to get our trains into Knoxville, and to forward the
defensive works at that place, where it had been determined to make a
stand Longstreet advanced from Loudon in two columns. McLaws's
division taking the left road, leading to Campbell's Station, and
Hood's division (commanded by Jenkins), the one to the right,
following the line of the railroad to Lenoir's. The latter soon came
in contact with the Federal skirmishers and drove them slowly back
but failed to reach Lenoir's that day. Every effort was made during
the night to ascertain Burnside's movements, but his bold and
vigilant rear guard succeeded in completely concealing them. By
daybreak the whole force was on the road, and when the Confederates
advanced they found Lenoir's deserted.
The road upon which Burnside was
moving, followed by Jenkins, intersects that along which McLaws was
advancing, about a mile south west of Campbell's Station. It was
therefore essential to the safety of his train, if not of his entire
command, that Burnside should reach the junction before McLaws. Just
before daylight on the 16th of November, Hartranft's division took
the advance of Burnside's column from Lenoir's and pushed forward as
rapidly as the roads permitted, followed by the trains and by the
other troops. McLaws, with full knowledge of the importance of
seizing the intersection of the roads, was making every endeavor to
get possession before the arrival of Burnside. He was opposed by a
small force, but his march like Hartranft's, was impeded by the mud
resulting from heavy rains. It thus became a race for the position.
Hartranft won by perhaps half an hour, and turning west on the
Kingston road, quickly deployed his division in such manner as to
confront McLaws, and at the same time cover the London road along
which our trains were moving.
During the movement from Lenoir's,
Burnside's rear guard, composed of Colonel William Humphrey's
brigade, had several sharp encounters with Jenkins's advance, in
which Humphrey handled his forces so well as to excite the admiration
of both friends and foes, always standing long enough, but never too
long.
Scarcely had Hartranft's dispositions
been made when McLaws appeared and attacked, but Hartrauft
steadfastly held his ground until the remainder of our troops and all
our trains had safely passed. The trains continued on the road to
Knoxville, while the troops were formed in line of battle about half
a mile beyond the junction, with Ferrero's division on the right, and
White's in prolongation to the left, whereupon Hartranft withdrew
from his advanced position and took his place in line on the left of
White. A small cavalry force scouted the roads on each flank of the
line. About noon Longstreet unsuccessfully attacked our right, and
afterward our left center. Later, taking advantage of a wooded ridge
to conceal the march, he attempted to turn our left flank with three
brigades of Jenkins's division, but our scouts soon discovered and
reported the movement. Burnside had determined to retire to a new
position about two thirds of a mile to his rear, and this development
but slightly hastened his withdrawal from the first line. The
difficult and hazardous undertaking was successfully accomplished in
the face of the enemy. All who saw it say that the troops moved with
the greatest coolness, deliberation, and precision under a heavy and
continuous fire.
McLaws's division promptly advanced to
attack the new position, while Jenkins continued his turning
movement, but the difficulties of the ground delayed him until
nightfall and stopped his further progress. McLaws attacked and
failed to make an impression, and at the close of the action Burnside
remained in possession of his own ground until after dark, and then
continued his movement to Knoxville, the head of his column appearing
there about daybreak next morning November 17th. He had gained his
object and therefore was fairly entitled to claim a victory.
Burnside placed his whole loss in this
important affair of Campbell's Station at about 300, Jenkins reported
his as 174. It is probable that the losses on both sides, including
McLaws's, were about equal.
During the fight Burnside had
instructed me to select lines of defense around Knoxville and have
everything prepared to put the troops into position as fast as they
should arrive. I was well acquainted with the ground, and but little
further examination was necessary to enable me to designate, in
writing, the proposed location of each organization. The
topographical features of the vicinity of Knoxville give that place
decided strength as a military position. {See
maps pp 636 and 736} On
the northern or right bank of the Holston, a narrow table land, or
ridge, beginning about two miles east of the town extends down the
river to Lenoir's some 24 miles. This ridge is generally elevated
about 150 feet above the river, but with many higher points. Its
width at Knoxville is about 1300 yards, and the valley bounding it on
the north-west, parallel with the river is perhaps 50 feet above that
stream at the ordinary stage of water. The East Tennessee Virginia
and Georgia railroad is located along the valley, which was almost
entirely clear of timber. At short intervals the ridge is cut through
by small streams emptying into the Holston, two of which called First
and Second Creeks, run through the town at a distance apart of about
one thousand yards. The main portion of Knoxville, as it existed at
the time of the siege, occupied that portion of the table-land
included between the two creeks, the river and the valley. East
Knoxville was situated next east of First Creek, upon an elevation
known as Temperance Hill. East of Temperance Hill, and separated from
it by a depression in the ridge, is Mabry's Hill, the highest ground
on the north side of the Holston within cannon range of the town.
Beyond this the ground with a few minor elevations gradually descends
to the level of the valley. Flint Hill is immediately upon the bank
of the river, south of Temperance Hill. Third Creek a little more
than a mile westward from Second Creek, forms the south-westerly
limit of another natural division of the ridge including the hill
north west from the college. North-westerly from the river are found
successive ridges; the most important was occupied by the
Confederates, across the valley a mile from our line. South of the
Holston the ground rises in a series of prominent points, or knobs,
the highest of which is directly opposite Knoxville on the
prolongation of Gay street. These knobs form a range, the crest line
of which is parallel with the river at an average distance from it of
about half a mile, with a wide valley beyond.
On the Knoxville side of the Holston,
our line rested upon the river about a quarter of a mile below the
mouth of Second Creek extended from there at an angle of about 82°
with the river for 900 yards to Battery Noble, then bending about 50ยบ
to the northward continued a little more than 600 yards to Fort
Sanders, where it changed direction about 65°
to the eastward, and overlooking the valley followed the crest of the
bluff, parallel with the general course of the river, for some 1600
yards to Battery Wiltsie, opposite the railroad station, including in
this part of the line Battery Zoellner between Fort Sanders and
Second Creek, Battery Galpin, just east of Second Creek, and Fort
Comstock, between Battery Galpin and Battery Wiltsie. From the last
named, with a slight change of direction toward the river, the line
continued along the crest of the bluff, over Temperance Hill to
Mabry's Hill, a distance of 2400 yards, including Battery
Billingsley, just west of First Creek, Fort Huntington Smith on
Temperance Hill, Battery Clifton Lee, and Battery Stearman, in the
depression between Temperance Hill and Mabry's Hill, and Fort Hill on
the extreme easterly point of Mabry's Hill. From here it turned
sharply to the southward for 1300 yards and reached the river at a
ravine about 1000 yards above the mouth of First Creek. A continuous
line of infantry cover connected all these positions and dams were
built at the crossing of First and Second Creeks which, by backing
the water, formed considerable obstacles, especially in front of
Temperance Hill where the line was parallel with the course of First
Creek for 1200 yards and the pond impassable without bridges. A short
interior line was established from Fort Sanders to Second Creek near
its mouth. This included Fort Byington built around the college.
Another line extended from Temperance Hill to Flint Hill terminating
in Battery Fearns.
On the south side of the river such of
the heights (four in number) as were necessary to the defense were
occupied by detached works with extensions for infantry cover,
insufficient, however, to make the line continuous, or even
approximately so. Fort Stanley was built on the hill directly
opposite Knoxville, and a line of ordinary rifle-trenches was carried
eastward from it across the Sevierville road and to the adjacent
height. The hill nearly opposite the mouth of Second Creek was
occupied by Fort Dickerson, and the next one to the westward by Fort
Higley.
The arrangements for the defense of the
position on the north side of the Holston were necessarily made in
the most hurried manner. The earth works known as Fort Sanders and
Fort Huntington Smith, intended for a very different condition of
affairs, were so far advanced toward completion when Longstreet
appeared before Knoxville, that their use without modification was
compulsory. Neither of the plans was what it would have been had the
works been designed for parts of a continuous line. Especially was
this the case with respect to Fort Sanders, the trace of which was
such that under the stress of circumstances its north western bastion
became a prominent salient of the main line, and notwithstanding the
measures taken to remedy this objectionable feature its existence
caused us great anxiety. The sector without fire of the bastion
referred to (the one attacked) would have been a sector without fire
for the line, but for the arrangements made on either side of it to
overcome the defect as far as possible. The fire thus obtained in
front of this bastion was not all that could have been desired, but
the event proved that it was sufficient. That Longstreet's renowned
infantry failed to carry it by assault demonstrated that there were
no very serious defects unprovided for.
(Source: Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War: Being for the Most ..., Volume 3, Part 2, edited by Robert
Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buel)
